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Abstract—The current trend in commercial processors is 
producing multi-core architectures which pose both an 
opportunity and a challenge for future space based processing. 
The opportunity is how to leverage multi-core processors for 
high intensity computing applications and thus provide an order 
of magnitude increase in onboard processing capability with less 
size, mass, and power. The challenge is to provide the requisite 
safety and reliability in an extremely challenging radiation 
environment. 
The objective is to advance from multiple single processor 
systems typically flown to a fault tolerant multi-core system. 
Software based methods for multi-core processor fault tolerance 
to single event effects (SEEs) causing interrupts or ‘bit-flips’ are 
investigated and we propose to utilize additional cores and 
memory resources together with newly developed software 
protection techniques. This work also assesses the optimal trade 
space between reliability and performance. Our work is based 
on the modern compiler “LLVM” as it is ported to many 
architectures, where we implement optimization passes that 
enable automatic addition of protection techniques including N-
modular redundancy (NMR) and error detection and correction 
(EDAC) at assembly/instruction level to languages supported. 
The optimization passes modify the intermediate representation 
of the source code meaning it could be applied for any high level 
language, and any processor architecture supported by the 
LLVM framework. In our initial experiments, we implement 
separately triple modular redundancy (TMR) and error 
detection and correction codes including (Hamming, BCH) at 
instruction level. We combine these two methods for critical 
applications, where we first TMR our instructions, and then use 
EDAC as a further measure, when TMR is not able to correct 
the errors originating from the SEE.  
Our initial experiments show good performance (about 10% 
overhead) when protecting the memory of code using double 
error detection single error correction hamming code and TMR 
(Triple modular redundancy), further work is needed to 
improve the performance when protecting the memory of code 
using the BCH code. This work would be highly valuable, both 
to satellites/space but also in general computing such as in in 
aircraft, automotive, server farms, and medical equipment (or 
anywhere that needs safety critical performance) as hardware 
gets smaller and more susceptible. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Processors for space have stringent requirements such as high 
performance, low cost, low power dissipation, and immunity 
from radiation and environmental effects. Processors 
available for space applications fulfil only some of these 
requirements. A revolution has taken place in commercial off 
the shelf (COTS) processor architectures in recent years. 
Multi-core processing has enabled a two to three order-of-
magnitude improvement in performance, fulfilling many of 
the above requirements except for their susceptibility to 
radiation and environmental effects. 
This research contributes to alleviating this problem by 
extending compiler functionality to mitigate against space-
borne SEEs on processor architectures and allowing for 
regular coding found on Earth to be applicable in space. The 
current gap in performance between COTS and radiation 
hardened by design (RHBD) processor architectures is 
estimated to be between five and ten years, and at a fraction 
of the cost. Furthermore, there is an ever increasing need for 
greater processing capabilities in space applications that 
continually pushes the space industry to consider using 
COTS components. Common practices in industry, such as 
hardware triplication, hardware-based error correction, and 
cross strapping, allow for reduced risk to SEEs in space. 
While both Radiation hardened (RH) and RHBD processors 
are less susceptible to radiation effects, they are expensive 
and only target a very small market (aerospace/defense). But 
by exploiting opportunities in commercial multi-core 
architectures and treating this system as a set of redundant 
processors, we can leverage the multi-core architecture in 
software, associated high frequency and throughput 
performance. This can provide an order of magnitude 
increase in onboard processing capability with less volume, 
mass, and power. 
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2. SOFTWARE-BASED RADIATION HARDENING 
In the ARGOS project at Stanford [1], experiments were 
carried out on two processor boards: one radiation hardened, 
and the other using COTS parts with different software fault-
tolerance techniques. The experiment on the COTS processor 
implemented various error detection and correction 
techniques. The two processors are 32-bit, the RH3000 and 
the IDT3081. In this experiment, software-implemented 
EDAC provided protection for code segments and 
significantly enhanced the availability of a system in a  
“low-radiation” space environment. The software EDAC 
implemented in the ARGOS experiment could be widely 
improved using a better performance COTS multicore CPU 
architectures, where faster, multiple error detection and 
correction algorithms could be implemented by exploiting 
the greater resources. 
Shoestring [2], Fault Tolerance Software Checking [3], and 
DAFT [4] which are implemented using the LLVM compiler. 
While Shoestring is a single core solution and DAFT is 
multicore CPU protection solution, memory in these 
techniques is still vulnerable to SEEs. Error Detection by 
Duplicated Instructions (EDDI) [5], the CASTED, decoupled 
Compiler-based instruction-level fault-tolerance (DRIFT) 
[6], Composite Data Type Protection Algorithm (CDTP) [6] 
are implemented using the GCC compiler, by duplicating 
instructions and inserting compare instructions where 
needed. EDDI is capable of covering both the CPU and 
memory from SEEs, but only ported to the MIPS architecture. 
CDTP only protects memory, with significant overhead. 
CASTED and DRIFT only protect the CPU. Software 
Implemented Fault Tolerance (SWIFT) [7] and SRMT are 
implemented using OpenIMPACT [8] and Intel production 
compiler and ICC 9.0 compilers respectively. SWIFT is 
single core solution, SRMT is multicore but has large 
overhead. Both previous techniques consider memory 
protected in hardware. Other techniques for protecting only 
the CPU are Process-Level Replication (PLR), Thread Level 
Replication (TLR), Heartbeats [9] , and Efficient Online 
Multiprocessor Replay via Speculation and External 
Determinism (Respec) [10], PLR and TLR replicate code 
three times, and use a majority voter for error detection and 
correction. Respec duplicate code twice and rollback to a 
state free of errors in case of error detection. Heartbeat uses a 
scoreboard in memory updated by the CPUs. All of these 
techniques add large overhead and the protection code has to 
be added manually. 
It has been observed that a minimal overhead was produced 
when error detection and correction codes were implemented 
at compiler level. Amongst compiler implementations, 
LLVM has shown to be popular with many projects. When 
providing a multicore solution (error detection and 
correction), it is inevitable to have an overhead, caused by 
spawning, communicating, and joining threads. Current 
solutions implemented in a single core do not show this. 
3. MULTICORE ARCHITECTURE & LLVM 
The technological advances in COTS has led to a dramatic 
growth in the clock frequency and in the quantity of logic 
(number of transistors) that a chip can host. These new 
features are exploited in order to further boost performance 
using architectural techniques. Figure-1 shows the significant 
gap between terrestrial and space processors, where 
terrestrial processor reach up to 3.6 GHz in frequency and up 
to 238,000 MIPS. Space processors lag this advancement, 
reaching only 1 GHz in frequency and 4000 MIPS. 
 
 
Figure 1. Performance of Earth vs Space Processors 
By making terrestrial processors radiation tolerant using 
efficient software techniques, the gap could be closed and the 
space industry could benefit from new technological 
advances. 
 
4. PROPOSED LLVM EDAC & TMR PASSES 
This work proposes implementing LLVM passes to 
automatically detect and correct errors caused by the SEEs. 
This work will be supported by multiple high level languages, 
and multiple processing architectures (supported by the 
LLVM framework). The LLVM Compiler [11] is the 
backbone of this work and is broken into three parts: 
 The Frontend takes a high level language and 
transforms it into LLVM Intermediate Representation 
(IR). This stage uses the Lexer which transforms a 
sequence of characters into a sequence of tokens and 
classifies them. The Abstract Syntax Tree (AST), 
representing the source code of a programming 
language in a tree form, and the Parser examine the 
lexed code syntactically according to the rules of the 
language's grammar. 
 The Optimizer takes the LLVM IR and returns an 
optimized LLVM IR – e.g. for area, speed, etc. 
 The Backend takes the optimized LLVM IR and returns 
machine or executable code suitable for a given 
architecture.  
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In our implementation, we are going to modify the optimizer 
stage of the compiler allowing us to target multiple high level 
languages and multiple processing architectures. Figure-3 
shows examples of high level languages and processing 
architectures supported by LLVM. 
 
Common 
optimizer
Ada 
frontend
C frontend
X86 Backend
Fortran 
frontend
PowerPc 
Backend
Arm 
Backend
 
Figure 3. LLVM Optimizer with examples of supported 
high level languages & processing architectures. 
The automatic implementation of error detection and 
correction code is achieved by adding redundancy and 
comparison instructions. We begin by running an analysis 
pass that will determine if and where protection can be added. 
This analysis pass will be able to analyze the instructions, 
functions and memory to determine data type, return values, 
and useful statistics regarding the memory usage, including 
new allocations and read/write operations. 
Both memory and CPUs will be protected, starting with the 
memory, and later the pass will be extended to protect the 
multicore architecture. The extension to multicore will be 
achieved by automatically calling parallelism libraries, 
starting with the pthread library [12], to achieve redundancy 
in available CPUs. Techniques to reduce the spawning, 
communication and joining of threads will be implemented 
in order to minimize the overhead. 
The memory will be protected using combinations of NMR 
or EDAC, NMR includes dual modular redundancy and triple 
modular redundancy (TMR) which depends on the resources 
available. The EDAC will be implemented using single and 
multiple error correction codes depending on the error rate. 
In addition to minimizing the overhead of multithreading, 
this work considers automatic parallelization and improving 
data locality for better use of the caches. 
5. IMPLEMENTATION & EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
In these experiments, analysis and optimization passes have 
been implemented in order to protect the memory of the 
processor architecture. The analysis pass checks the code, 
finds the memory instructions and provides some statistics. 
Optimization pass adds protection code to the LLVM IR of 
the code, the pass is able to detect the type of memory 
instruction and summons the appropriate technique to protect 
it accordingly. In the first experiments TMR and EDAC have 
been used, after the high level code intended to protect is 
transformed to LLVM IR.  
To start, our new LLVM pass implementation is introduced 
by combining different techniques for increased reliability 
using TMR for memory, and differing EDAC codes for the 
processor. A code in the LLVM IR is divided to the following 
layers [13]: 
 A module is a top level LLVM class, every other layer 
is included in it. It represents the highest level structure. 
An iterator over a Module returns all its Functions. 
 Modules include Functions a class representing a single 
procedure containing chunks of executable code. An 
iterator over a Function returns all of its BasicBlocks. 
 BasicBlocks are housed by Functions, they represent 
single entry single exit section of the code. The 
BasicBlock houses a list of instructions, the last one is a 
terminator instruction. An iterator over a BasicBlock 
returns all its instructions. 
 An Instruction is a single code statement. Each 
instruction has an opcode and a parent (BasicBlock). 
 
5.1. Software TMR Experiments 
In order to implement instructions TMR, two replicates 
instructions are required in addition to the original one. 
Replicating instructions could be achieved either by cloning 
the original ones using clone() [14], or by building new 
instructions using the IRBuilder [15]. Here, the aim is to 
implement the algorithm shown in Figure 4, where the 
numbers in the flowchart represent the instructions that will 
be TMR-ed. clone() [14] returns a replicate of the instruction, 
similar to the original except that the clone instruction has no 
BasicBlock parent (not inserted into a BasicBlock), and it has 
no class name. In order to successfully clone an instruction, 
it should be assigned a name and a parent BasicBlock, 
meaning it should be included in the control flow graph 
(CFG). Ignoring this part is the reason why the new 
instructions are deleted by the optimizer. IRBuilder provides 
a uniform API [16] for creating instructions and integrating 
them into a BasicBlock: either at the end of a BasicBlock, or 
at a specific location.  
The instruction TMR is implemented following the steps:  
1. The pass iterates through all the code layers and detects 
memory allocation instructions, and allocates new 
addresses of the code. These new addresses are used to 
replicate instructions three times. In two allocations, the 
redundant values are stored and in the 3rd alloca or 
allocaTMR, the protected value is stored. 
2. The 2nd step is to iterate again through the code layers 
and detect the store instructions, used to store a data in 
the preceding memory addresses. Two new stores for 
every detection are created in the replicated address 
allocation in step 1, Figure 5. 
3. Iterate through all the code layers and detect the load 
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instructions, and are used to return data of a given 
address in memory. If the address of the detected load 
matches the original allocation instruction of step 1, it 
will be replaced with allocaTMR – which is the 
protected address. 
Figure 4. Software TMR Algorithm 
Origin 
alloca1
alloca3
allocaTMR
alloca2
Origin store1
 
Figure 5. New allocations of the original store instruction 
The TMR algorithm shown in Figure 4 uses the compare 
instruction to make decisions, and then it jumps to execute 
the correct block accordingly. The jumps are a conditional or 
unconditional branch instructions, both cmp and branch are 
created using the IRBuilder. In the decision making the 
outcome of the compare instructions are combined using and 
instructions. 
5.2. In-line Software EDAC Experiments 
Two methods for automatically implementing any EDAC 
code were implemented in order to protect the memory of a 
high level programming language at runtime. For proof of 
concept, protection of integers and floating point using 
selected EDAC algorithms have been implemented; the 
Hamming code for single error correction double error 
detection and BCH codes with the ability of multiple error 
detection and correction. There were two choices for 
implementing inline EDAC: 
 The 1st method turns the EDAC code into LLVM IR 
and then links it with the program that is intended to be 
protected along with the benchmark, extra instructions, 
new allocations for the EDAC check bits, and function 
calls to the EDAC encoding and decoding functions; see 
Figure 6. 
 
EDAC functions 
code 
High level 
language code
EDAC in 
LLVM IR 
LLVM IR of 
code with 
EDAC 
functions calls
Clang
LLVM 
Pass
Linker  
LLVM IR of 
code with 
EDAC
Clang
Assembly 
or 
executable 
code with 
EDAC 
 
Figure 6. EDAC using Linker 
 The 2nd method is directly in the pass, without using the 
linker, meaning the EDAC encoding and decoding 
function are automatically generated using our compiler 
pass; see Figure 7. 
 
High level 
code
LLVM 
Pass
Code in LLVM IR 
with EDAC
Clang
Assembly or 
executable 
code with EDAC 
 
Figure 7. EDAC without Linker 
The following steps explain the pass of the 2nd method of 
implementation: 
1. The pass will run through the intermediate 
representation of the code and detect all the memory 
allocations.   
2. For every allocation in step 1 a new allocation to store 
the check bits are added. 
3. If a store is detected to the allocation of step 1, it will be 
encoded, and then the check bits are stored inside the 
new allocations that were created in step 2.  
4. Each time a new store is detected to the allocations in 
step 1, new check bits are created to replace the check 
Return 1 or 2 or 3 
Return 1
Return 2
Return 3
Start 
TMR
End TMR
noyes
yes no
yes
no
yes
no
Cmp(1,2)AndCmp(1,3)AndCmp(2,3)
Cmp(1,2)AndCmp(1,3)
Cmp(1,2)AndCmp(2,3)
Cmp(1,3)AndCmp(2,3)
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bits of step 3. 
5. In the decoding part, the decoder function will be called 
every time a read from the protected allocation is found, 
in case of error detection we correct it and replace the 
damaged data and check bits. This function is also 
called periodically in case of error occurrence between 
reading and writing. 
 
6. RESULTS & EVALUATION 
After the implementation, the work has been evaluated in 
terms of the delay, and the size of the additional code, 
different tools for our evaluation have been used. 
1. perf to measure delays and number of cycles [17]. 
2. A profiling tool has been implemented, an LLVM 
pass to count the number of instructions in our code. 
 
Table 1 shows the CPU profiling results for Fibonacci series 
before and after implementing the following techniques: 
TMR, Hamming, TMR + Hamming and BCH code. 
Table 1. Profiling results of Fibonacci Benchmark 
Code 
Execution 
Time (s) 
No. of 
Cycles 
No. of 
Instructions 
Over-
head 
(%) 
Fibonacci 0.001286844 1,856,346 48 0 
+ TMR 0.001419664 1,898,231 157 10.32 
+ Ham 0.001359356 2,052,954 316 5.63 
+ TMR  
+ HAM 
0.001424670 2,218,110 500 10.71 
+ BCH 0.008445104 15,638,019 1961 556.26 
 
The primary results show a very encouraging outcome, where 
code for memory protection has been automatically 
generated, this method supports LLVM high level languages 
and its CPU architectures. When using TMR, Hamming 
code, and TMR combined with Hamming, the memory of 
code is protected with a minimal overhead, and this was 
expected, since both techniques do not have very complicated 
computations when detecting and correcting errors. In the 
other hand, BCH has shown enormous overhead this is due 
to the intense computations of the encoding/decoding 
functions, this could be improved by increasing the data 
block size of the encoding/decoding functions, to have less 
function calls. Some compiler optimizations could be used to 
make the code run faster by automatically parallelizing 
function calls and reducing data dependency, especially in 
loops for better caching. 
7. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK  
Bit-flips originated from SEEs are a prominent problem in 
memory cards. EDAC and TMR codes have been used to 
resolve this problem effectively. These codes are commonly 
implemented in hardware using the redundant memory 
resources and encoding-decoding hardware. In processor 
architectures where hardware memory EDAC is not at hand, 
the reliability of the processor architecture can be enhanced 
by enabling shielding via software. Codes and techniques that 
can be used for automatic software implementation of EDAC 
at compiler are discussed and compared. TMR is the fastest 
in terms of execution time, with an average of 10 % overhead, 
however it is more suitable for small sized code, because it 
consumes more memory. The EDAC codes implemented are 
the Hamming and the BCH codes, while both only add check 
bits to the memory, making them suitable for codes with 
larger sizes, the BCH codes is the slowest (5 times slower 
than the original overhead), because of its ability to detect 
and correct multiple errors. The overhead generated could be 
minimized using automatic compiler parallelization, which 
will be implemented and tested in the future. This work will 
be further extended towards multicore architectures 
protection, in addition to memory system protection that has 
been started in the 1st experiments of this work. 
This work has automatically implemented protection code on 
the LLVM’s supported high level languages. This was 
enabled using compiler passes to generate the protection 
code. The EDAC protection code could be implemented 
using the linker as additional step or directly using our pass. 
Different benchmarks have been tested, our implementation 
is able to protect integers and floating point, and will be 
extended to protect other data types in the future. The primary 
results show good performance for TMR and single error 
correction codes, compared to the state of the art the CDTP 
technique used to protect memory with GCC compiler with 
an overhead of 86%-146%, and this is encouraging to 
implement CPU protection side by side with memory 
protection that have been implemented, with an overhead 
predicted to be in the norms of the state of the art technique 
EDDI protecting both memory and CPU with an overhead of 
62%, furthermore this work will be extended to multicore 
CPU protection. Turning to multicore protection from SEEs 
will be achieved using automatic code generation for 
parallelism libraries call, starting with the pthread library and 
extending the work towards OpenMP [18]. 
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